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F

ichte wrote the Gn111dl4([e in great haste in 1794-95, though he first
formed the idea of a philosophic system built upon the l in 1791. 1
Before claiming his professorship in Jena as Reinhold's successor, Fichte had
crafted a _prospectus of the new philosophy, meant to attract students to his
lectures. 2 In "On the Concept ofTheory of Science," he promised a system
that not only satisfied Reinhold's formal demand-philosophy must be
based on universally admitted principles-but adopted Reinhold's ultimate
fact-the subject-ohject stmcture of consciousness-as it'i content. Fichte
planned the Gnmdla,ge as a course hook to accompany the first set of lec
tures; it was written, printed, and distributed in installments to Fichte's stu
dents and selected friends. It was never meant for public view as either a
popular or technical statement of the system of transcendental philosophy.
Someone unfamiliar with Fichte's systematic intentions, as announced
in the "Review of Aenesidemus" and part 3 of the prospectus essay, would
have found reading the first number of the Grund/age a demanding task. 3
Fichte had a vast capacity for sustained and detailed argument, but he rarely
stepped back to a wider framework to provide transitions, overviews, or
simple statements of the conclusions that his arguments advanced. Even if
by August 1795 the attentive reader had the whole work before her and
could appreciate the practical part-which employs a novel psychological
vocabulary to construct the subconscious (or in principle unconscious)
platforms for modeling empirical consciousness- there were still few dues
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about the author's systematic intentions and how these particular discus
sions of presentation and feeling advanced them.
Before Fichte came on the scene in 1793-94, Reinhold had cleared
the ground for a system of transcendental philosophy by demanding that
Kant's writings be turned into a philosophical system. Yet his own work
substituted for a pliilosoplrical system a popularization of Kantian episte
mology, for Reinhold could not think any farther than the sheer givenness
of subject-object polarity in empirical consciousness. 4 Fichte takes the
same contents in the Grund/age and goes beyond the "facts of conscious. ness" to a foundational or "principled" deduction of the being-for-a-sub
ject of objectivity as such (i.e., a deduction of presentation) and of the
subject's drive-to-alter-objectivity as such (i.e., a deduction of appetition). 5
It is these deductions that transform facts of consciousness into Theory of
Science. Fichte added argument or logical rigor to support the "facts" and
so turned the Kantian transcendental (or heuristic) analysis of conscious
ness into theory, or as it was then said: science.
Fichte publicly laid claim to this accomplishment in the "Introduc
tions" to Theory of Science he published in 1797-98. What he does not
do is explain the peculiarity of this first version of the first Wissensch.aftslehre
and its tortured deductions. I find it is similar to Gottfried Leibniz's Mon
adology: the construction of "spiritual substance" as a psychic machine
driven by the opposed forces of perception and appetition. 6 Like Leibniz's
elegant metaphysical construction, Fichte's deduction of objectivity or
empirical limitation inside consciousness has two interrelated sides: what
from the cognitive side supplies objectivity because it is felt to be sheer
limitation or "check" is from the practical side self-affection or the non
causing causality of striving.? Though this double deduction of objectivity
(i.e., the set of necessary conditions for empirical consciousness) is in its
own right an argumentative tour de force, the basic task of the Theory of
Science is to show transcendental idealism: explanation from the point of
view of the experiencing subject, free of contradiction. As Fichte read
Kant's text, Kant's philosophy was not free of contradiction, especially in
its unargued adopted of the "thing in itself" as the ground of objectivity.
In place of this ad hoc (or unexplained) explainer, Fichte.'s deduction of
objectivity provides a coherent platform for anchoring more detailed
accounts of logic, knowledge, nature, society, law, and morality and for the
oretically unifying them all as products of the l's self-realizing activity or
spontaneity. Fichte himself seems unaware that "system" is possible only as
a coherentist, not a foundational program.
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Fichte does not announce that the Grundlage works a highly abstract
abstractive reflection upon the I's activity, 8 and that it uses arguments both
intricate and pedestrian to convey i11tellect11<1l intuition of the I in its com
pletely skeletal, transcendental (i.e., wholly nonempirical) shape. Nor does
he admit that the work ·provides only foundations for an eventual system,
or better, a logical canon for all possible systems that do not in principle
exclude an account of consciousness. Some early programmatic statements
by Fichte suggested that an idealistic philosophy as a totality would con
nect empirical cognition with action and resolve the object-dependence of
cognition into the infinite moral task of object-conquest. Though
Goethe's stage manager might promise scenic excursions through heaven,
· earth, and hell, Fichte makes no such extravagant promise in 1794-95.9 He
cannot at the start display the whole pageant of the realm of conscious
ness: sensation, matter, nature, individual will, community, world, and prov
identially ordered history. Schel1ing will do this concisely and beautifully
in the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, a work that lives up to its
name. Eschewing this large canvas and grand theme, Fichte first tackles the
question of the foundation of idealism at its problematic core: if there is to
be idealism, one must find an explanation for objectivity and for the object
dependent states of presentation-which :run through and mediate all acts
of empirical consciousness, volitional and affective and well as directly cog
nitive. If at any point objectivity is ·explained by objects, by "things" on
which the I and its activity depend, idealism is abolished and the freedom,
spontaneity, and self-positing activity that idealism seeks to defend are
swept away.
For one wishing to make a philosophy of Kant's Criticism, Kant's
resort to a "thing in itself" as a final ground of reality and objectivity was
more than a minor difficulty: Some accmmt of objectivity is needed, some
explanation of the intractable resistance of the known to alteration by
consciousness and for the imperviousness of empirical reality to alteration
by will. Absent this, presentation would be indistinguishable from dream,
present sensation from one imaginatively reproduced. But if the philoso
pher takes the realistic path and ontologically privileges objectivity, he
makes knowledge a commerce of things imaged and things "without" and
the knower becomes a machine among things, a shuttle shifting between
woof and warp, not the activity of relating, interrelating, self-relating.
Realism can product "picture theories,'' but never a viewer of the picture.
There is no inching into realism, no quiet accommodation with dogma
tism. Reinhold had made all the accommodations; battling for a textually
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·0---------------------------"correct" Kant, he had lost the war for idealism. The activity that is I and
does I must be beginning, middle, and end for transcendental idealism.

II
In 1795 Schelling was finishing his theological studies at Tiibingen, where
he had deeply studied Plato and Kant. Irritated by the "theologizing" Kan
tians there who wished to use Kant's moral postulate of God's existence to
make quick work of their apologetics, Schelling made the question of the
possibility of a systematic transcendental philosophy his own. 10 Though he
has been represented as a mere popularizer and disciple of Fichte's early in
his career (not least of all by Fichte himself) l 1 Schelling in many ways
shows himself to be Fichte's equal in the years of supposed "discipleship."
In 1794-1797 Schelling is more consistently interested in the scope and
completeness of systematic philosophy than Fichte is, while Fichte is more
·careful about guarding the transcendental perspective and securing its
foundations. Schelling's taste for abstraction pulls him away from the tran
scendental perspective, both in theoretical philosophy and in practical
domains such as ethics and philosophy of history. In the early essays that
Fichte was pleased to read as evidence of discipleship I find more meta
physical anticipations of the identity philosophy of the 1801 Presentation of
My System than I do evidence of a careful thinking along with Fichte. The
latter's detailed phenomenology of cognition and volition is missing; in its
place is the metaphysical scaffolding for the grand architecture of system.
Though both philosophers use some version of the contrast between
dogmatism and criticism to situate their vies, Schelling is consistently
attracted (and repelled) by the explanatory seamlessness of dogmatism, per
sonified in the steel rigor of Baruch de Spinoza's axiomatized meta
physics.12 Though he sometimes allies himself with a pure transcendental
position from 1794 through 1800, Schelling is receptive toward Spinoza's
fatalism or the absence of freedom, at least on the level of empirical voli
tion. 13 Or to put it another way, Schelling lacks Fichte's vivid intuition that
spontaneous activity is the core of selfhood, or that the I is self-realizing as
self-thinking. He prefers the third-person grammar of production to
describe the transcendental subject and its activity, while Fichte favors the
first-person language of self-positing. In On, the I as Prindple, Schelling uses
the terms "I" and "the absolute" interchangeably.
As I read Schelling's essays of 1794 and early 1795, I find Spinoza as

,--~-----------2'.~'":.~c-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d _ ' . :~ I f • ~
obvious an influence as Fichte. Accordingly, I find little surprising in the
metaphysical ambivalence Schelling voices later in 1795 in the Philosophical
Letters on Dogmatism and Critids1n. Though he there ranks the 111eory tif Sd
ence alongside Kant's Critique as a universal standard to measure all possible
philosophies, he nonetheless finds nati.1ralistic metaphysics equally choice
worthy as philosophy of freedom. 14 All theoretical philosophies have posed
the same unanswerable problem: Why is there experience at all? (Kant);
Why has idea stepped out of the absolute and become opposed to objects?
(Spinoza, rephrased by Lessing); Why are my perceptions accompanied by
the feeling of necessity and unalterability? (Fichte). Schelling finds the
basis for choice between systems is personal and idiosyncratic: logically
considered, the option for fatalistic self-annihilation under dogmatism is as
cogent as is the choice for autonomy.15
We now turn directly to Schelling's On the I. The essay was occa
sioned, inspired if you will, by receipt of the first fascicle of the Grund/age.
Its title reflects that inspiration, and the first eight sections paraphrase of
Fichte opening three sections on the fundamental principles, both in their
content and their vocabulary. That the reflection is direct can be seen in
Fichte's reception of it as a popularization of his own work. Comments he
made to Reinhold about the his dissatisfaction with the literary form of
the Gnmdlage, and about the desirability of a reader linking up with his
intuitions, not his words, show Fichte was more interested in having others
share his general position than he was in their recitation of a catechism. 16
Fichte, however, seems not to have noticed that Schelling's adherence to
the transcendental position soon wears thin in On the I, just as it had in
Schelling's first work, 011 the Possibility ,ifa U11itlersal Form ,if Pltifos<Jp/iy. The
public noted their difference more carefully; in his historical review, Rein
hold suggests that Fichte and Schelling made the breakthrough to a puri
fied Kantian philosophy at roughly the same time.17
How faithful a reflection of Fichte's line of thought is found in even
these opening sections of Schelling's essay? Fichte's style of thought is
original and rigorously systematic or deductive; his writing is generally a
long march from hypothesis to conclusion, uninterrupted by metacom
ment or historical comparisons. Schelling, on the other hand, is a synthetic
or historical thinker who works at some distance from direct hypothesis
and argumentation, though he will argue to cinch a point. When Fichte
speaks of a philosophy founded on principles and of the necessity for an
unconditional principle, he seems to be making a plainly logical demand.
When Schelling paraphrases the same arguments one sees-as in the most

Q

PART

4.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

0------------------------Fichtean parts of the 1794 Ut1iversal Form essay, where absolute philosophy
is viewed as an interpenetration of form and content, and where what is to
be thought determines how it is to be thought-that the discussion is also
driven by historical figures and their similar styles of argument, e.g., by
Plato's quest for a nonhypothetical and deductive science or by Reinhold's
search for a philosophy secured by universal principles. In that essay
Schelling in fact takes Fichte's I-the principle that unites form (identity)
and content (selfhood)-as but one convenient illustration of this deduc
tive model of absolute philosophy. 18 Since his concern is more with meta
physics than epistemology or psychology, he feels free to abstract the log
ical content from Fichte's three basic principles and use the so-called laws
of identity, sufficient reason, and synthesis to generate Kant's quite unex
plained table of categories.19
Schelling's attempt to deduce Kant's categories in Universal Form is an
original effort on his part to unify Kantian philosophy, as is the final sec
tion of On the I where he brings all the forms of judgment Kant discussed
under the general heading of a modal synthesis which progresses from pos
sibility, to actuality, to necessity. By contrast, Fichte uses Kant's categories
in the theoretical section of the Gnmdlage (§ 4) in a "destructive" rather
than deductive manner: the argument reduces all the categories of rela
tion--cause and effect, substance and accident, and reciprocal determina
tion-to the paradoxical idea of a "determinate determinability." When
thought gives up trying to think this thought and "imagination'' is brought
in to reinterpret it as the wavering inside and beyond a boundary that is
intuition, and when that interpretation is surpassed as well in the curious
alienation of productive activity to a "fictive" not-I in the "Deduction of
Presentation," it seems that Fichte has dissolved the theoretical into nporfo
and that only recourse to models of action will permit the stabilization of
any discourse about cognition.
Even when Schelling is conceptually the closest to Fichte in Ott the I,
he speaks a different language. In the first section of the Gnmdlage Fichte
describes the I as pure self-positing and pure activity, as that which exists
in virtue of its self-positing and vice versa, as simultaneously agent and
product, action and cause of action.20The language is not particularly psy
chological, but it does focus on act, action, and agent. Schelling. however,
takes pains not to speak of the I as a subject: if it is called "I," it is at the
conclusion of a process of reasoning similar to the "negative theology" of
the medievals. The absolute and unconditioned cannot be a1-i object, argues
Schelling, for an object is both a thing and something conditioned: be-
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thinged, or limited by other things. But by the same reasoning the uncon
ditioned cannot be a subject either, for subjects "have" objects and their
subjecthood is conditioned by their epistemic dependence on an object.
To speak of an "unconditioned" subject would be almost as oxymoronic as
to speak of an absolute object. Philosophers ought to speak carefully, scolds
Schelling, and not fall into blather about the "existence" of God or a "thing
greater than which cannot be conceived." To call the unconditioned "the
absolute I" may be permitted as a concession to inexact habits of speech,
but its sole meaning is the 11ttaly ,umobjerti11e.21 When· Schelling includes
this essay in his Wtirks in 1809, after the public break with Fichte, he under
scores the '"purity" of its conception of transcendental idealism and its lack
of contamination by the subjectivism (Fichte's, of course) which later
befell philosophy.22
Schelling could not (or choose not to) follow the theoretical deduc
tions of the Gnmdla~l(e, for he is not interested at this point in Fichte's pre
cise problem: the objectivity and necessity conveyed by presentation, even
when explained from the l's activity and self-positing. He instead chooses
to do what Fichte does not, or to do extensively what Fichte does briefly,
to characterize the absolute I in terms of categories. If one takes "cate
gories" in the strict sense Kant gave to the term, neither philosopher "cat
egorizes" the unconditioned I. Fichte connects I am! with I thiuk! or self
positing to explain the self-realization and self-assertion involved in the J's
positing, but beiug or existence is not a Kanti~m category. Schelling charac
terizes the unconditioned I at length, but not in terms of finite categories,
e.g., multiplicity, or finite substance, or causality, for these can be applied
only to objects or finite things. He does employ the metacategories used
to group the twelve: quantity, quality, relation, and ,n()dality. In general, his
approach is negative-theological here, too, as in the basic characterization
of the unconditioned principle. He begins to work through the Kantian
table in a straight line, e.g., denying empirical unity, plurality, or multi
plicity and so concluding to supernumerical unity. His argument soon
veers back to Spinoza's Ethics, however, and under the metacategory of
"quality" it asserts the infinity, indivisibility, and immutability of· the I.
Under relation, Schelling again follows Spinoza rather than Kant and
ascribes to the 1 absolute immanent causality rather than moral or purpo
sive causality. He treats modality not as a metacategory, hut even in con
sidering the triad of possibility, actuality and necessity, he most plainly
departs from Kant's guidance. These concepts which Kant thought not real
categories, i.e., not stricdy objective features of phenomena, but points of
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0---------------------------view dependent 011 our per;ception and judgment of thingst Schelbug caUs
the "sylleps-i.s of all categories,'' or ''the sylleptiical concepts of ,aU synthesis."
A certain fid1tean lmi6cation of Kant's table is achieved here, it should be
noted, for po,ss:ilbility, actuality, and necessity an~ interpreted as thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis.
ff one reviews On the I's argument as a whote, one finds two distinct
(not easily ,11ecnnciled) styles of thought in ip:1-ay. O ,n the one hand, there is
the transcendental idea1isin1 of Kanit and Fichte th.wt ,d emands th.at the
thinkable be 1iirnfoed by the con.diti-ons of phenomenal subje,ct-objectivity,
and on the other, the nieltaphysical monism of Spinoza that does not h-es. itt~rte ito charac,t erize the who.le as such, or even rt o ta!k-e the p,rincip-le for the
explanation of entities ititside experience a<s itself an item of philosophical
im;:esitigation. Had ithey carefully -read each other's wri1tings and gott-e n dear
about their own .assumptiom;, Fichte and Schelling would have sta:rted
bickering much eadier th.an they do in their ,correspondenc-e of
1800-1802,. Schelling's gradluallly gmwing into !his "own" system, the
system of identity, is largely a matter of him getting dear about his S;pillil
oz,i:sm, namely-, re,cogniz1ng the :logical impossibility of being Ka.intian and
Spinozist. Though I have s,uggested in prinit that the objective id~alisms of
Schdling and Hegd were merely an extension of transcendental ide
alism-on the formal side toward heuristic uni.fication, on the material
side. roward a broaderne-d notion of "experience" that included cornmulJili.ity,
social interaction.1 even wodd history-I now see such ,t hat was not the
case., how1ever much I wish iit were. The idend.,t y philosophers snuck : uonnd
the transcendenrtal :in order to return to die transcendent; they rexpl-oited
,t he ambi;g uity of theological language applied to ,cu.lturr:a1 entities to do so.
Jeavillilg it unclear whether they talked of the abs,olute whether .they were
talking of the'' 'One and AU" o.ir -of a ''whole of parts." Our histories of phi
losophy in thei,r desi-ce to see the We:ltJeist working in a tidy, linear patltern
generally om.it the uncomfortable fact that both Fichte and ScbeUing even
itually .iretll!lrn to philo:soplhical theism.
1

III
How much was Sch1eUiing prevented &o;m app,r eciating the Theory of Sci
ence by ,t he Grnndlage's truncated pubiication? A,t the time he wroite On the
l, he had not seen the se,otion on the foundation of practical philosophy se,c 
tion mat was issu.1edl ait betweenJuly and August 17'95. Though this lacks a
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lucid and popular commentary that would coordinate it with earlier s·ec
tions of the work, grappling with it is crucial for any reader who would
understand Fichte's struggle over the congruence of the empirical I, depen
dent on the not-I in its presentational mode, with the absolute I, stipulated
to he self-realizing and active without external limitation. Without a
glimpse into the double .exorcism of the not-I from the system, once in the
deduction of presentation where it is explained as the l's own activity, alien
ated and hence pictured by the imagination as alien, and again in the deduc
tion of drive where difference is seen as primitively inhabiting the self
because the self is self-affected or acts against itself as noncausing causality,
it is impossible to see that the Gnmdlage's train of thought comes to com
pletion. If Fichte's reader does not follow the hints in section three of "The
Concept of Theory of Science" and think along with him how the prac
tical Wissenscheftslehre is really the foundation of theoretical, she is likely to
misread the "foundations of practical theory of science" as the whole prac
tical philosophy sketched out in the Aenesidemus review, and to think of
the Grund/age's striving as moral endeavor, the collective historical drift of
the human community to realize freedom. Schelling indicates in On the I
that this is his general understanding of Fichte's philosophy as a whole. 23
The only thing, however, that is deduced in the Gnmdlage's concluding
section is bare will, Leibnizean appetite, the impetus toward the minimal
alteration of empirical reality. It is this appetite, or drive, that interacts with
presentation in that it is drive to cltange presentation, which explains, if any
thing does, how the empirical I is linked to an objective reality by which it
affects itself. In the context of the whole Theory of Science, presentation
reduces to will, epistemology to philosophy of action; it is this all-embracing
stance of action within the constraints af empirical jinilllde a11d intersubjective limi
tation that provides the platform for ethics, and social and legal philosophy.
Schelling is not far from this view of practical philosophy as a whole:
his consistent Spinozism drives him to embrace an empirical determinism
at the phenomenal level, and to deny the possibility of anything being
other than just as it is on the absolute level, where freedom is absolute but
no alternatives are possible. The reason he adopts this position, however, is
the immanent causality of the unconditional in dependent and condi
tioned being; he is not yet able to conceive, as he will in the System (?{Tran
scendental Idealism, that the final locator of the phenomenal individual is the
interaction of wills in community, or the self-affection of will as a mutu
ally constraining community of agents.
Schelling's faithfulness to the Fichtean transcendental construction
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decays at the point in On the I where the ultimate Spinozistic metaphysical
category of infinite power is deployed to explain the causality of the uncon
ditioned upon the conditioned. 24 Had Schelling read the Gnmdlage's con
clusion, perhaps he would have been turned away from the arid metaphys
ical monism of his essay's second half and explored in earnest the affective
context into which Spinoza used the idea of power a.s conatus or "endeavor
to exist." Schelling in fact shows no great interest in human psychology or
morals or philosophy of action, until he abandons the naruralism of his
early systems for the spi~itualism of his 1809 essay on human freedom.

IV
There are obvious limitations to a comparative study of two philosophers
who shared similar visions of the task of philosophy, who work indepen
dently but along roughly parallel lines, who read each other's work casually
but not fully or in depth. One arrives at no dear linear picture of"'causal
influence," as if Schelling had wanted to be the devote disciple Fichte took
him for, nor at any agonal picture of flatly incompatible positions. This dis
appoints our dramatic or literary expectations, for a tale ought to be more
significant when edited and retold, and a literary dialogue ought to have clear
positions and figures, e.g., a Hylas and a Philonous.
Perhaps a historical comparison can bring the work of Fichte and
Schelling in 1795 into closer focus. The author of 011 the I and that of the
Foundations stand to each other as do Spinoza and Leibniz.25 Spinoza and
Schelling share a taste for the metaphysical big picture, and prefer to see
substance infinite and will or action finite. Fichte and Leibniz share a taste
for the phenomenal, for explanation from the point of view of the per
ceiver and agent; they share a vitalism as well. Nonetheless Fichte and
Schelling (sometimes, for the latte.r) are post-Kantians and work with the
hypothetical-heuristic territory of transcendental supposition, while the
pre-Kantian figures acknowledge no in principle intellectual constraints
upon their thinking, once the enigmatic Cartesian criteria of clarity, dis·
tinctness, and adequacy have been met.
Whether the above comparison is illuminating, I am not sure. If one
can recognize, however, that Schelling's construal of transcendental idealism
in 1794-95 is metaphysical or Spinozist, that it reifies and distorts the tran
scendental point of view, perhaps this can shed light on what Fichte was
really doing in the Gnmdlage. It is dear that this work does not ca.sh in the
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broad systematic promises of "Aenesidemus'' and the "Concept of Theory
of Science," part 3. I have suggested instead that it brings forward a two
part yoked analysis of the structures of action-and-reaction on which any
detailed account of human cognition would have to be built: the logical
foundation for phenomenologies of perception and of volition.26 The first
part of this analysis, section 4, is a statics of finitude, an account of the epis
temic dependence of subjecthood on objectivity. It seems to be an ideal
istic counterpart of the account Spinoza offered of mind as idea or reflec
tion of a state of body (or self), or rather of change <'f state in the body (or
self). The second part, section 5, is a dymm,ics of finitude. It seems to be a
reflection of Leibniz's monad or perception substance that is driven by
appetite, i.e., by anticipation of d1t11ti!e ofstate. The finite subject or empirical
I perceives only its own states, or change of states, and its awareness is either
coupled with or foeled by movement toward a change of state. Because the
I never is a state, but is always and only the process of changing states, the
space between subject and object first opens up and the difference between
ha11fr1t, states and the states that arise and pass away comes to prominence.
That opening up of the epistemic and logical-predicative gap is conscio11s11ess. If this is what Fichte did, we indeed have a deduction of the Rein
holdean .. facts of consciousness."27

NOTES
1. Fichte got a hint that philosophy might be built upon the I from the
preacher Johann Schulz of Konigsberg in 1791. By 1793-94 he was privately
announcing his conviction that the I was both self-realizing and self-thinking. See
Manfred Zahn, "Editorischer Bericht" to J. G. Fichte, Cnmdlage der gesammte,r l-·Vis
senscl1q(ts/c/,re (1794-95), in J C. Ficlrte-Cesamta11~f(,1lie ,fer Ba)1erisc/1c11 Akaclcmie der
Wisse11sd1a{ten , eds. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky, and Erich Fuchs
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frornmann-Holzboog, 1964tf), 1/2: 176, 177n.
2. Fichte wrote Ucbcr den Be.'<rtff dfr Wissr11scl1'!frsle/,re between February and
April 1794, wbile delivering the outlines of what would become the Cnmdla,.(?e in
a lecture series at Zurich. Though there was no firm outline of the practical phi
losophy at thjs time, the main framework of the theoretic-al philosophy was in
place. Ibid. pp. 179-81.
3. Grund/age der iesm11111re,r i,i.,,'ssensduftslel,rr's first number, comprising the
ground principles and the theoretical philosophy, was published in September,
1794. The rest of the work, chiefly the foundations of practical philosophy, did not
appear until the end of July the foUowing year. Ibid., p. 175.
4. See Karl Leondard Reinhold, Vcrsud1 eim:r ,reuc11 11ret>rie des mc11sd1licl,e11

e
.194

PART

4.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

Vowellimgsvenniigens (1789) (Darmstadt: Wissenschafdiche Buchgesellschaft, 1963),
pp. 216-97, and "Ueber die Moglichkeit der Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft,"
in Beytriige Zlfr Bericl1t11ng bisheriger MifJverstii,idnisse der Philosopl,en: Erster Band, das
Fundament der Elemetarphilosophie betreffend (Hamburg: Meiner, 1978), p,. 165.
5. See Fichte's comment in the programmatic part 3 of the essay "On the
Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre": ..... It is only in the second part that the
Theoretical Part is ,precisely delimited and given a sound foundation" (Daniel
Breazeale, ed. and trans., Fichte: Early PhilMopliica/ Writings {Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1988), p. 135). Schelling shows some awareness of this, perhaps,
when he writes: "Your empirical I would never strive to maintain ito1 identity if
_the absolute [I] were not originally posited through itself as pure identity by its
absolute power." ( Vom Ich a/s Princip der Philosophie, &liclling Werke: Akademie Aus
gabe 1/2 [Stuttgart: Frommann, 1980], 105.)
6. See Monado/ogy,§§ 14-15, 19,64, 79.
7. " ... The concept of a causality which is not a causality is, however, the
concept of striving. Such causality is conceivable only under the condition of a
completed approximation to infinity.... This concept of striving (the necessity of
which has to be demonstrated) provides the foundation of the second part of the
Wissenschaftslehre, which is called the Practical Part." "On the Concept of the
Wissenschaftslehre,'' in Breazeale, Fichte, pp. 134-35. See also "Review of Aen
esidemus;' in ibid., pp. 74-76.
8. See Fichte's comments on the method of abstraction and reflection in
"On .the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre,'' pp. 126-27, 132-33.
9. Faust I: 339-342.
10. In a letter to Hegel of January 6, 1795, Schelling speaks of contemporary
philosophy as oppressed by the dead letter of Kant's text. He quotes with approval
Fichte's quip that it requires the genius of a Socrates to figure Kant out, and points
to him as the "new hero" on the philosophical scene. The event that occasions
Schelling's enthusiasm is his receipt of the first section of Gn.mdlage der .~esammte11
Wissensd1eftslelire. See Hartmut Buchner, "Editorischer Bericht," Vim, Id1, pp.
18-20.
11. On July 2, 1795, Fichte writes to Reinhold about the publication of Mlm
Ich. He sees it only as a commentary on his thought; though he is happy it can
serve as a vehicle for his being understood by those who cannot understand lrim,
he wishes that ScheUing would acknowledge its unoriginal ·origin. Fichte
nonetheless pronounces himself pleased with the work, especially with its refer
ences to Spinoza, whose system is most apt to explain his own. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
12. In a letter to Hegel on February 4, 1795, Schelling replies to his friend's
question whether he thinks Kant's moral "proof" for God's existence leads to a
personal God. He says he has traded theism for a Fichtean, purely moral concept
of deity:"In this respect, I have become a Spinozist. Do not be surprised." He clar
ifies the remark by explaining that both Kant and Spinoza, pose concepts of an
absolute, Kant one of the I or its freedom, Spinoza one of an absolute object or

not-I. Ibid., p. 23. Buchner cautions that this text ought to make an interpreter
wary of seeing too much Fichte in Vim, Id,. But he also notes that the Spinoza
that Schelling incorporates into this essay is a Spinoza viewed through transcen
dental lenses (ibid., p. 27).
13. In the letter to H egel of January 6, 1795, where he praises Fichte as the
present-day hero of philosophy, Schelling doses by voicing his determination to
provide a modern (transcendental?) counterpart of Spinoza's Ethics (Ibid., p. 19.)
14. Pltifosopltischr Bri~fe iiber D()gmatismm 1111J Kriticism11s (1795) in Siimtfiche
H•hke, hrsg. K. EA. Schelling (Stuttgart & Augsburg: Cotta, 1856 ff), voL 1, pp.
302-305.
15. Ibid., pp. 310-13.
16. In a letter to Reinhold of April 1795, Fichte confesses that the theoret
ical philosophy is haunted by an intrinsic darkness, which he hopes the practical
philosophy will be able to dispel (Zahn, "Editorischer Bericht," p. t 85). On July
2, 1795, Fichte writes to Reinhold: "What I want to say is something that cannot
be said, nor conceived, but only iut11ire,I. What 1 say can do no more than lead the
reader to form the desired intuition in him. I would warn him who would study
my writings to let words be words. and to seek only to rap into the series of my
intuitions, even to keep reading when he does not understand until in the end a
spark of light is struck." (Cited in ibid., pp. 2 ltr 17). Fichte repeats the same
warning to Reinhold when he sends him the practical philosophy in August 1795,
saying that the sense of the whole of his philosophy is not to be built up from its
individual parts, but rather the reverse: the individual part must be illuminated in
and through a sense of the whole (ibid., p. 219).
In correspondence with Goethe, Fichte faults himself for his inability to
achieve the lucidity of "intellectual feeling" (ibid., p. 186). .By 1801, Fichte finds
the exposition of the Cn1tuJlaJc darker than it needs be, and complains that the
letter, fit to name the thing, kills the spirit (ibid ., p. 187).
17. See C. L. Reinhold, "Ueher den gegenwa.rtigen Zustand der Metaphysik
und der transcendentalen Philosophie i.i berha upt," in Ausu,a/,/ vcrmiscbtrr Scl,rffit'II,
Zu•dter Tl,eil CTena:Johann Maukee, 1797), pp. 331-34.
18. See Ucbcr tfit, .\Ji'i;(!lic/1keit d ner Form tier Philosophie iiberl1a11pr. in Siimtlid1c
1-#rkt', vol. 1, pp. 94-96.
19. See ibid., pp. 104-109. In Vc>111 Id, § 10, Schelling argues that the cate
gories originate as forms of synthesis between the I and not- I (11211-113n). This
section demonstrates a more detailed acquaintance with Fichte's three funda
mental principles than does any other pass.age in the essay.
20. ]<>lrmw Gottlieb Fichfes Sc'immtliche Hi ·rke, ed. I. H. Fichte (Berlin: Viet &
Co., 1845-46), I: 96. Reprinted, along with j,,ha11tt Cottlit·b Fichtes 1111cl1,~cfo.ssmc
vl/4:rke (Bonn: Adolphus-Marcus, 1834-35), as Fichtcs J:-verke (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1971).
21. Vi1111 Ic/1, §. 3, AA (, 2: 89-90.
22. Ibid., p. 81.
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23. In an enthusiastic letter to Hegel on February 4, 1795, Schelling pictures
the relation of theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy this way: in theo
retical philosophy an infinite sphere is divided up into many finite spheres by the
positing of limits. A contradiction ensues betW\:en the finite and the infinite, and
it is suspended only with the breakthrough into the infmite that the practical
effects. The practical stance
demands the destruction of finitude and so transports us to the super
sensible world. (Practical reason does what theoretical reason cannot,
since it is enfeebled by objects). But we find in the supersensible nothing
other than our absolute I, for it alone describes the infinite sphere. There
is no supersensible world for us other than the absolute I.
Cited in Buchner, "Editorischer Bericht," pp. 22-24.
24. Section 14 makes clear that ascribing absolute power to the I abolishes
the supposed ability of a finite mind to act for the best. The rule of wisdom is sus
pended in favor of the determinations of force (Vom lch, Akademie Ausg11be, pp.
122-23). To this he joins a spirited polemic against his theological instructors, the
"seminary" Kantians. Kant's notorious postulates of God's existence, willingness to
reward merit with happiness, and of the endless duration of sou] have nothing to
do with morality, which is simply the unconditioned command that the limited I
become the absolute I. Were this in fact possible, the moral law would be sus
pended as obligatory and instead become a law of nature (ibid., pp. 125-26).
25. Schelling makes dear his admiration of Spinoza and his wish to combine
certain features of Kantianism and Spinozism in the close of the preface to Vom
lch. Though it is at least programmatically clear that for the Kantian philosophy
the whole essence of the human is freedom , Schelling thinks that to date this had
been worked out only in fragments. He voices the hope that he can produce a
coi,nterpart to Spinoza's Ethics along this line. Vtmi lch, Akademie Ausgabe, I, 2: 78,
80. Schelling later attempts to for mulate a " system of freedom" in the 1809 essay
on human freedom.
26. That there is a logical model of action and reaction for all psychic events
is a Leibnizean imight: an immaterial substance is defined as one that contains
force and perception, "force" being the principle of change or action. "On the
Supersensihle Element in Knowledge, and on the Immaterial · in Nature," in
Lci11bfliz Selectiom, ed. P. Weiner (New York: Schribne~. 1951), p. 354.
27. The same opening of a gap explains, i.e., provides a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for, the n;.flection Spinoza posited between idea and ideatum; this
reflection (based on the registering of changes of state) itself explains self-aware
ness: the fact that when one has an idea one can also have an idea of the idea. See
Ethics 2: P13Dem, P16Cor2, Pl9Dem, P21S.

